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A number of commentators have suggested that central banks should reconsider the
desirability of inflation targeting in the light of the global financial crisis. Early on, Paul
DeGrauwe (2007) asserted that the crisis had “unveiled the fallacy” of the consensus view in
favor of inflation targeting as an approach; a little later, Axel Leijonhufvud (2008) argued
that inflation targeting “has failed” as a strategy, and that “the problems we now face are
in large part due to this policy failure”; and more recently, Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto
Giovannini (2010) have proposed that inflation targeting, as conventionally practiced, “can
... increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.”
How seriously should inflation-targeting central banks take these charges? I think it is
important to distinguish between inflation targeting as such and the more specific doctrine
— enunciated by some prominent proponents of inflation targeting, but not, in my view, a
defining feature of this approach to the conduct of monetary policy — according to which
central banks need not pay attention to asset prices, or more generally to concerns relating
to financial stability, when making monetary policy decisions.
I do not believe that the central claims that were made by proponents of inflation tar-
geting on behalf of this approach are challenged in any direct way by the events of the crisis.
It is worth recalling what inflation targeting was intended to achieve. It was expected,
above all, to serve to stabilize medium-term inflation expectations. This, it was asserted,
would allow monetary policy to be used more aggressively for purposes of stabilization of
the real economy, without so much sacrifice of price stability as would be required in the ab-
sence of such well-anchored inflation expectations. It was expected to eliminate a particular
source of macroeconomic instability, namely, the possibility of wage-price spirals triggered
by commodity-price shocks, of the kind that had been problematic in the 1970s. And it was
expected to allow countries to avoid the possibility of a deflationary trap of the kind experi-
enced by many countries in the 1930s, in which expectations of deflation, once entrenched,
become self-fulfilling.
Failures of any of these central claims to be born out in practice would give one serious
reason to reconsider the basic theory of inflation targeting. But thus far they have held up
quite well. Rather than discrediting inflation targeting, one could argue that the events of
the last several years have provided further vindication for it. Despite a serious disruption
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of the world financial system, that some have compared in magnitude to that suffered in the
1930s, this time none of the major economies fell into deflationary spirals. And despite large
swings in oil prices, the effects on the dynamics of wages and prices this time have been
modest. These comparatively benign outcomes are surely due in large part to the fact that
inflation expectations in most of the major economies have remained quite well anchored in
the face of these substantial disturbances. And it is arguable that the credibility with regard
to control of the rate of inflation that the leading central banks have achieved over the past
twenty years deserves a great deal of the credit for this stability.
Of course, the global financial crisis has done great damage, and this has understandably
led to questions as to whether the disaster might have been avoided, or its severity reduced,
had policies been different. The aspects of policy that have most obviously been called into
question have to do with the regulation of the financial system. But it is also worth asking
whether alternative monetary policies might have made a difference.
In particular, the crisis does justify reconsideration of at least one aspect of the inflation
targeting doctrine that had developed over the previous two decades. This is the thesis that
a central bank with an inflation target need not pay attention to financial developments —
such as a credit-financed real estate boom — except to the extent that such developments
affect the outlook for inflation (or perhaps, either for inflation or for real activity). While
this thesis is not, in my view, a central, definitional aspect of an inflation targeting regime, it
was undoubtedly a common view among proponents of inflation targeting prior to the crisis.
It is therefore important to reconsider both the extent to which such a view is defensible, and
the extent to which it is a necessary element of a coherent approach to inflation targeting.
Can this previously conventional view still be maintained, after recent experience? And if
not, would this require abandonment of inflation targeting as well?
I shall begin by reviewing some common arguments that have been offered for setting
aside the question of financial stability in the conduct of monetary policy. I conclude that
there is a persuasive case for taking this issue into account, as at least one factor, when
making decisions about interest rates. But I shall also argue that it is possible to do this in
a way that represents a natural extension of “flexible inflation targeting,” as that concept
has been developed in the literature prior to the crisis. It should thus be possible to adapt
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the framework used to structure monetary policy deliberations in a way that takes account
of legitimate concerns raised by the recent crisis, but without having to discard what was
learned from the previous quarter century of experience with and analysis of methods of
inflation stabilization.
1 Is Financial Stability Relevant to Monetary Policy
Deliberations?
Prior to the global financial crisis, many (though certainly not all) central bankers took
the view that considerations of financial stability should play no role at all when making
decisions about monetary policy. A variety of arguments were offered in defense of this view,
and it is worth discussing them briefly before proposing my own view of the matter.
One of the simplest arguments was that, however desirable it might be to act to head
off financial crises were one able to do so, such crises are simply not predictable enough for
there to be any point in trying to “lean against” developing financial-sector risks. This view
gained particular credence when the issue was cast as one of using monetary policy to lean
against (or even to “prick”) asset “bubbles,” which were in turn defined as situations in
which the market price of some asset was significantly higher than its fundamental value.
How, it was asked, should central banks expect to know the correct valuation of assets if
the correct value was not sufficiently obvious for market participants to have gotten it right.
Because “bubbles” are, by their nature, situations that are difficult to identify until after
they have burst, it was argued to be more practical for a central bank to simply plan to
“mop up” after the crash of the bubble than to try to prevent it from occurring.
But complacency about the ease of “mopping up” after a financial crisis is much more
difficult after the recent global crisis; despite unprecedented and heroic efforts on the part
of a number of central banks, it was not possible to prevent a very sharp contraction of
world trade and economic activity, and even years later many economies are still struggling
with the after-effects of the crisis. And the excuse that crises are unpredictable is not as
compelling as it might at first seem. After all, in order for it to be useful to adjust policy in
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order to reduce the risk of financial crisis, one needn’t be able to predict exactly when crises
will occur; it suffices that one be able to identify circumstances under which the risk of a
crisis increases (and that there be policies that can affect these risks). It is true enough that
our understanding of how to measure such risks is much more incomplete than we should
want. But there are indicators that have been found to have predictive value (e.g., Borio
and Drehmann, 2009), and it is hard to justify not trying to improve our ability to measure
financial crisis risks.
It is important, I believe, to realize that the real issue is not identifying whether one type
of asset or another is currently overvalued. Instead, what central banks (and potentially
other “macro-prudential” regulators) need to be able to monitor is the degree to which the
positions taken by leveraged institutions pose a risk to financial stability. Of course, a belief
that multiple institutions have each borrowed in order to invest in an asset the value of
which is likely to collapse, because its current price is far above its true value, is one possible
reason to believe that there is a substantial risk of a systemic crisis; but a central bank
need not be able to identify asset over-valuations in order to recognize situations in which
the probability of simultaneous financial distress at several institutions is non-trivial. The
typical case against which the central bank should be on guard is not one in which the mean
of the distribution of possible future net worths for the institutions is too low, but rather one
in which the lower tail of the distribution is too large. Moreover, the question of greatest
concern is not even the size of the lower tail of outcomes for individual institutions, but the
probability of a bad joint outcome. This question of systemic risk is not one with which
individual institutions may have much concern in their financial decisions, and so the belief
that is useful for the central bank or other regulators to assess systemic risk does not depend
on a belief that the regulators are able to forecast better than private institutions can.
A second ground for skepticism about the relevance of financial stability concerns in
monetary policymaking is based on doubts about how much monetary policy can do to
influence the buildup of risks to financial stability, even granting that it might be possible
to identify such risks in real time. Adjustment of the short-term interest rates controlled
by central banks will have little effect on stock-market or real-estate “bubbles,” it is often
argued — if short rates are relevant to such valuations at all, the change in monetary policy
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required to make a difference would be very severe, and, given the unpredictability of the
evolution of such bubbles, the effects of the sudden, sharp change in monetary policy would
be difficult to predict. Again it is often concluded that it should be easier to “mop up”
afterwards than to try to contain a bubble as it develops, on the ground that it is clearer
what monetary policy can do to help once the problem becomes a shortage of liquidity.
But once again, I think that many discussions of this point dismiss the potential relevance
of monetary policy too easily, by posing the question as one of using interest-rate policy to
control “bubbles” in asset prices. The real issue, I would argue, should not be one of
controlling the possible mis-pricing of assets in the marketplace — where the central bank
has good reason to doubt whether its judgments should be more reliable than those of market
participants — but rather, one of seeking to deter extreme levels of leverage and of maturity
transformation in the financial sector. Once the problem is recast in this way, the relevance
of interest-rate policy decisions — whether to exacerbate the problem or to mitigate it —
is more obvious. Even modest changes in short-term rates can have a significant effect
on firms’ incentives to seek high degrees of leverage or excessively short-term sources of
funding.1 Again, this is something that we need to understand better than we currently do;
acceptance that monetary policy deliberations should take account of the consequences of
the policy decision for financial stability will require a sustained research effort, to develop
the quantitative models that will be needed as a basis for such a discussion. But there is
certainly no ground, on the basis of current economic knowledge, to assert that interest-rate
policy is likely to be irrelevant.
A third ground for skepticism would assert that, even if one grants that monetary policy
might be able to influence the risk of occurrence of a financial crisis, there are surely better
tools available for this purpose. It is best to assign only one goal to each available policy
instrument, in accordance with what is sometimes called the “Tinbergen principle,” and in
that case monetary policy is not the right tool to use to ensure financial stability. That
should instead be the task of supervisory policy, of regulatory policy, or perhaps of new
1Woodford (2011b) provides an example of an explicit model in which monetary policy decisions affect
the endogenous capital structure decisions of intermediaries, and as a consequence, the severity of the “fire
sale” externalities associated with a crisis state.
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instruments of “macro-prudential policy” such as countercyclical capital requirements.
It is indeed true that these other aspects of policy should have an important role in
maintaining financial stability. While I have just argued that it is plausible to believe that
monetary policy has an effect on the risk of financial crisis, it hardly follows from this that
the interest-rate policy of the central bank can or should provide a complete solution to the
problem. That would be true only if one believed not only that interest-rate policy can be
a very effective tool to deal with the problem, but that there are no costs to subordinating
interest-rate policy to that end. The latter is surely not the case, as the model sketched in
the next section is intended to illustrate. Hence acceptance of the proposition that monetary
policy is relevant to financial stability is no excuse for failing to improve bank regulation,
tighten capital requirements, or develop additional tools of macro-prudential policy.2
But by the same token, the existence of other instruments that can help to reduce the
risk of a financial crisis does not, in general, justify complete neglect of the issue of financial
stability in monetary policy deliberations. That would be true only if one could count on
the other policy instruments to completely eliminate the problem of financial instability, and
without other costs of having to resort to those instruments. This is unlikely, and at any
rate, it is certainly not the situation in which central banks already find themselves. The
recent crisis points up the weakness of the existing regulatory and supervisory regimes in
many countries, and while many reforms are currently under discussion, it is too soon to
be certain how much will change and how effective the new structures will be at controlling
risk-taking in the financial sector. Central banks should certainly applaud the development
of other tools that can help to minimize the risks to financial stability, as this can only make
their own task simpler and more effective; but until it is clear that the problem has genuinely
been solved by those other means, it would be prudent for them to also develop analytical
capability for thinking about the impact of their own actions on financial stability.
Still, one might reasonably ask, will there not be a conflict between the use of monetary
2Woodford (2011b) illustrates how the creation of an additional macro-prudential policy instrument, such
as variation in the interest rate paid on reserves, can improve both financial stability and the central bank’s
ability to achieve its traditional stabilization objectives of price stability and full utilization of productive
capacity.
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policy to control risks to financial stability, and the use of it to maintain price stability and
stable real activity? Yes, I think there will almost inevitably be a tension between these
alternative objectives, as the model in the next section illustrates. But I wish to argue
that this tension is no different, in principle, than the conflict between inflation stabilization
and output-gap stabilization, in the conventional theory of “flexible inflation targeting.”
Proponents of inflation targeting generally admit that the interest-rate policy required to
maintain complete stability of prices will not always be the same one that would best stabilize
aggregate output around its efficient level. And yet, in mainstream accounts of inflation
targeting — certainly in the view of it espoused by the theorists of inflation targeting, such
as Mervyn King, Ben Bernanke, and Lars Svensson, who are actually involved in the conduct
of monetary policy — it does not follow that one must therefore set aside all concern with
the effects of interest-rate policy on the real economy.3 Rather, it is argued that a sound
approach will seek to balance a concern for the effects of policy on real activity with a
concern for its effects on inflation; and it is furthermore argued that it should be possible
to use policy to mitigate short-run instability of the output gap without any substantial
sacrifice of the stability of medium-run inflation expectations.
The view that I wish to propose of the place of financial stability concerns in monetary
policy deliberations is a similar one. I think that central banks should admit that monetary
policy may well have consequences for financial stability, rather than pretending that the
issue should not be their responsibility because they have no influence over it; and that
they should recognize that it would require considerable luck for the policy that best serves
their traditional stabilization objectives to turn out always to coincide perfectly with the
one that is best from the standpoint of financial stability. Accordingly, I believe that it is
appropriate for a “flexible inflation targeting” central bank to endeavor to balance financial
stability objectives against both its price stability objective and its concern for output-gap
stabilization, when choosing among alternative short-run paths for the economy at a given
conjuncture. Nonetheless, I shall argue that it is possible to do this through a straightforward
adaptation of the way that inflation-targeting central banks already think about the short-
run tradeoff between price stability and output stability, and that once again an allowance
3See, e.g., King (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Svensson (2011).
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for other objectives in choosing among short-run transition paths should not require any
compromise of the primacy of price stability as the central bank’s longer-run objective.
2 A Simple Model of Optimal Stabilization with
Endogenous Financial Crises
A simple model may be helpful in clarifying the way in which an inflation targeting regime
could be modified to incorporate concerns for the effects of monetary policy decisions on
financial stability. In order to address the concerns raised above, it is essential that the
occurrence of crises that disrupt financial intermediation not be treated as purely exogenous,
as it is in analyses such as those of Cúrdia and Woodford (2009, 2011), Del Negro et al.
(2010), or Gertler and Karadi (2011), that treat only the question of how central-bank policy
can mitigate the effects of a crisis in the event that one occurs. Here I shall not propose any
sophisticated model of the endogenous mechanisms that give rise to a crisis — a complex
topic that is the subject of much ongoing research — but will instead simply postulate a
reduced-form model of the way in which endogenous state variables affect the probability of
a crisis, and consider how allowance for such a relationship would change the standard theory
of optimal monetary stabilization policy.4 Analysis on the basis of such a crude hypothesis
can at best be regarded as suggestive, rather than prescriptive. Nonetheless, if one believes
that a relationship of this general type is important, even though a correct specification
would be more complex, a simple analysis of the kind offered here may be more useful than
an analysis that assumes there are no such effects at all.
2.1 Sketch of the Model
Let us consider a simplified version of the model of the macroeconomic effects of credit
frictions developed in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009). The most important effect of the credit
frictions in that model is to modify the relation that would otherwise exist between aggregate
real expenditure and the path of interest rates. The model is one in which households
4That standard theory, abstracting from financial frictions, is reviewed in some detail in Woodford (2011a).
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are heterogeneous, and at a given point in time, some are credit-constrained while others
are not, and the marginal utilities of income of the two types differ as a result. (With
frictionless financial intermediation, the marginal utilities of the different households would
co-move perfectly, despite the differences in their incomes and spending opportunities.) A
key additional state variable of the model is Ωt, a measure of the gap that exists at any
time t between the marginal utilities of income of the two types. This variable measures
the distortion of the allocation of expenditure due to credit frictions — a larger value of Ωt
means that the marginal utility of borrowers exceeds that of savers to a greater extent, which
means that the spending by borrowers is inefficiently low to a greater extent — and hence
is a useful measure of the severity of credit frictions. In the Cúrdia-Woodford model, this
variable also corresponds to a credit spread between two different long-term bond yields: the
spread between the equilibrium yield on long-term bonds (of a particular duration) issued by
risky private borrowers on the one hand and those issued by the government on the other.5
An empirical correlate of this state variable would therefore be an average spread between
yields on risky corporate bonds and those on Treasury securities of a comparable maturity.
The reason this variable is important for the positive predictions of the model is that vari-
ations in Ωt shift the predicted relation between aggregate real expenditure and the average
marginal utility of income. In a representative-household model (or a model without finan-
cial frictions), the marginal utility of income should be a decreasing function of aggregate
expenditure; this structural relationship can be shifted by exogenous changes in government
purchases, household impatience to consume, or the marginal efficiency of investment oppor-
tunities, among other factors (the various sources of “IS disturbances” in a standard New
Keynesian model). In the Cúrdia-Woodford model, this relation is also shifted by changes
5In the paper, we show that, to a log-linear approximation, the variable Ωt (actually denoted Ω̂t in the
paper) will be a forward-looking moving average of the short-term credit spread (denoted by ω̂t), where
the short-term spread is the differential between the one-period interest rate at which private non-financial
borrowers can borrow and the one-period interest rate on government liabilities. Hence Ωt can alternatively
be expressed as the difference between forward-looking moving averages of those two different short-term
interest rates, which would correspond to the the spread between the yields on certain long-term bonds
issued by the two types of borrowers. The hypothetical bonds for which this would be exactly the credit
spread would be claims to a stream of future payments that are exponentially declining at a certain rate.
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in Ωt. Under the calibration proposed there as most realistic, a higher value of Ωt will lower
the marginal utility of income associated with a given level of aggregate expenditure, as a
consequence of the less efficient composition of expenditure; an increase in Ωt thus has effects
similar to those of a reduction in government purchases or a reduction in the attractiveness
of current private spending opportunities.
Because of this modification, the “intertemporal IS equation” of the basic (three-equation)
New Keynesian model takes the more general form
yt − gt + χΩt = Et[yt+1 − gt+1 + χΩt+1]− σ[it − Etπt+1], (2.1)
where yt denotes the output gap (i.e., the amount by which the log of aggregate real ex-
penditure exceeds the currently efficient level, which latter quantity is assumed to depend
solely on exogenous factors), gt is a composite both of the various exogenous factors that
shift the relation between the marginal utility of income and aggregate expenditure even in
the absence of credit frictions6 and of those that shift the efficient level of aggregate output,
it is a short-term nominal interest rate, πt+1 is the rate of inflation between periods t and
t+1, and all variables denote deviations from their steady-state values (so that constants are
omitted). Under the proposed calibration, the coefficients satisfy χ, σ > 0. In the presence
of credit frictions, the variable it (a weighted average of the interest rates that are relevant
for borrowers and savers respectively) is no longer identical with the central bank’s policy
rate, and this introduces an additional term if the IS equation is instead to be written in
terms of the policy rate, as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009). Here I omit that complication,
as I am not interested in deriving a rule for the particular instrument adjustment required to
achieve particular macroeconomic targets; for purposes of the present discussion, it suffices
that the it in (2.1) is a variable that the central bank can influence (even if the influence is
not quite so direct as in the case of the policy rate).
Under this calibration, real aggregate demand depends not only on exogenous factors
(such as the evolution of government purchases) and the expected path of (average) real
interest rates, but also on the magnitude of the distortions indicated by credit spreads; other
things equal, a larger value of Ωt will depress aggregate demand in period t. Thus the
6For example, an increase in government purchases increases the value of the term gt.
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additional Ωt terms in (2.1) can be thought of as representing what are sometimes called
“financial headwinds.”
For similar reasons, the model’s aggregate supply relation must be modified relative to
the familiar “New Keynesian Phillips Curve” specification, taking now the form
πt = κyyt + κΩΩt + βEtπt+1 + ut, (2.2)
where the coefficients satisfy κy, κΩ > 0, 0 < β < 1, and ut is an composite term representing
various possible exogenous “cost-push” factors. The credit frictions change this relationship
only through the appearance of the Ωt term, again reflecting the way that changes in Ωt
shift the relationship between aggregate real expenditure and the marginal utility of income.
One of the reasons for an upward-sloping short-run aggregate supply curve is that higher
real activity is associated with a lower marginal utility of income, which increases real wage
demands, and hence the real marginal cost of supplying goods. Since larger credit frictions
also reduce the average marginal utility of income, for a given level of real activity, they also
increase the real marginal cost and hence the inflationary pressure resulting from a given
level of real activity.
The crucial new element that I wish to consider here is some degree of endogeneity of
the evolution of the financial distortion measure {Ωt}.7 I shall simplify by assuming that Ωt
is always in one of two states: either it takes a low value Ω (the “normal” state) or a high
value Ω̄. I shall furthermore suppose that the probability each period of transition from the
crisis state back to the normal state (conditional on being in the crisis state) is 0 < δ < 1,
while the probability γt of transition from the normal state to the crisis state (conditional
on being in the normal state) is time-varying, and moreover (at least possibly) a function
of endogenous macroeconomic conditions. It is this potential endogeneity of the probability
γt of occurrence of a crisis that raises the question of the implications of monetary policy
7Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) already allow for one specific type of endogeneity of financial distortions:
in their model, Ωt is a forward-looking moving average of the short-run credit spread ωt, which is allowed
to depend on the current volume of privately intermediated credit, in addition to various exogenous factors.
This endogenous dependence of spreads on the volume of credit can be thought of as movement along a
“supply curve for intermediation” of the kind proposed in Woodford (2009); shifts in the location of the
supply curve, however, are purely exogenous disturbances in the model of Cúrdia and Woodford (2009).
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decisions for financial stability.
The assumption that financial conditions jump between two discrete states — in one of
which credit spreads are low, and in the other of which they are high — is obviously an over-
simplification, but if captures something important about financial crises of the kind with
which we are here concerned: that they are typically characterized by sudden, substantial
increases in credit spreads that are instead relatively stable under normal circumstances.
A regime-switching model is a parsimoniously parameterized way of capturing this episodic
character of periods of financial stress, as in the empirical model of Davig and Hakkio
(2010).8 An advantage of this approach is that it responds to a common complaint about
policy analyses using DSGE models, namely, that the use of local perturbation methods
necessarily abstracts from the possibility of occasional excursions far from the the normal
range of variation in the state variables as a result of nonlinearities — which extreme out-
comes are precisely the ones that one must be concerned about in an analysis of risks to
financial stability. A regime-switching model allows for a non-trivial probability of occasional
excursions far from normal conditions, and allows the probability of such excursions to be
endogenous (the critical issue for the present discussion). It does not seek to model the non-
linear mechanisms that actually allow a relatively abrupt transition to another part of the
state space to occur, instead contenting itself with a reduced-form model of the probability
of such an excursion occurring and a specification of the conditions that result from one on
average. But this is about as specific a model as we can expect to parameterize on the basis
of available empirical evidence, anyway, given the heterogeneity and relative infrequency of
crises. And it allows us to use local perturbation methods to analyze the linkages between
the various endogenous variables of such a model — including the transition probabilities
and the values of endogenous variables conditional on the regime that one is in — without
this requiring any assumption that crises do not involve large changes in the values of many
variables.
For purposes of illustration, I shall here assume one very simple kind of endogeneity of
the transition probability, Suppose that γt = γt(Lt), where Lt is a measure of the degree of
8In their model, the two states are characterized by different mean levels of the Kansas City Fed Financial
Stress Index, many elements of which are credit spreads (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009).
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t (L) > 0.
(The time subscript on the function means that there can also be exogenous shifts in this
function over time.) The idea of the positive dependence on leverage is that the more highly
levered financial institutions are, the smaller the unexpected decline in asset values required
to tip institutions into insolvency — or into a situation where there may be doubts about
their solvency — and hence the smaller the exogenous shock required to trigger a crisis.
Given some distribution function for the exogenous shocks, the lower the threshold for a
shock to trigger a crisis, the larger the probability that a crisis will occur over a given time
interval. Moreover, not only does greater leverage increase the probability that any given
bank will come to be in financial difficulty as a result of an exogenous shock, it also increases
the probability that a given bank’s financial distress will tip others into distress as well,
so that the chance of a chain reaction of significant magnitude. If the overall crisis state
represented by Ωt = Ω̄ occurs only when such a chain reaction occurs, then the probability is
likely to be sharply increasing in the degree of leverage beyond some point, though it might
well remain relatively constant (and low) for all degrees of leverage below some threshold.
Of course, both the risk of individual banks’ insolvency and the risk of a chain reaction
occurring depend on more than just the banks’ leverage ratios: for example, the degree of
maturity mismatch and liquidity mismatch between their assets and their liabilities is highly
important as well. Here I shall use a single variable Lt to stand for a variety of changes of
this kind in financing arrangements that increase the risk of financial instability, and all of
which tend to increase in periods when there is less risk avoidance by financial institutions.
The use of a single variable to summarize the relevant change in financial structure simplifies
the calculations below, and allows a fully optimal commitment to be described using fairly
simple equations. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that in practice an adequate model
will take account of only one dimension of financial structure, still less that precisely the
same single variable will be the most useful one for all countries. Local institutional details
are likely to matter even more for this aspect of the model than for structural relations such
as (2.1) and (2.2); the present analysis is intended as an illustration of a general approach
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to the problem, rather than as a presentation of a formula that can be directly applied once
one correctly associates local data series with the various symbols.
It remains to connect leverage (or financial risk-taking more generally) with the other
endogenous variables of the model. I shall slightly simplify the dynamics of the Cúrdia-
Woodford model by postulating a simple law of motion of the form
Lt = ρLt−1 + ξyt + vt, (2.3)
where vt is an exogenous disturbance term and the coefficients satisfy 0 < ρ < 1, ξ > 0.
This reduced-form relation combines two structural equations, one relating the growth of
aggregate bank assets (and hence the aggregate leverage Lt) to the rate at which new loans
are originated, and one relating the rate of new borrowing to the level of aggregate activity
(and hence to the output gap yt).
The rate of new lending (the equilibrium volume of intermediation) is an increasing func-
tion of the level of activity if an increase in incomes increases the demand for intermediation,
as in the derivation of the “XD curve” in Woodford (2010). In the model of Curdia and
Woodford (2009), the relation is increasing because expenditure by the borrowers is assumed
to be more sensitive to variations in the interest rate at which they can borrow than expen-
diture by savers is sensitive to variations in the interest rate earned on their savings. A shift
in monetary policy that increases aggregate expenditure also necessarily increases the share
of expenditure by borrowers, and so increases spending by borrowers more than it increases
their incomes, requiring an increase in new borrowing. The disturbance vt may reflect any
of a variety of factors: a shift in the relationship between bank assets and leverage, or more
generally, in the degree of risk that banks must take in order to finance assets of a given
volume, perhaps because of events that reduce bank capital or shift the penalties associated
with risk-taking; a shift in the relationship between the level of economic activity and the
output gap, due for example to a productivity shock; or a shift in the degree to which an
expansion of demand requires credit expansion, due for example to shocks with different
effects on borrowers and savers. To the extent that the changes in these relationships can
be treated as exogenous (and unaffected by monetary policy), they can be lumped together
in a single composite disturbance term.
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Our simple structural model then consists of the three equations (2.1) – (2.3) together
with the regime-switching model of the evolution of financial conditions, to determine the
four endogenous variables πt, yt, Lt,Ωt each period, given the central bank’s adjustment of
the path of it and the paths of the exogenous disturbances (including the timing of the
regime transitions).
2.2 A Criterion for Optimal Policy















for some weights λy, λΩ > 0, and a discount factor 0 < β < 1 that is the same as in (2.2).
This adds to the usual inflation and output-gap stabilization goals, standard in accounts of
flexible inflation targeting (e.g., Svensson, 2011), an additional goal of reducing the incidence
of financial crises (reflected by the assumption that λΩ > 0). Cúrdia and Woodford (2009)
show that an objective of this form can be justified as a quadratic approximation to the goal
of maximizing the average expected utility of households in their DSGE model with credit
frictions, in the case that all disturbances are small enough for a second-order Taylor series
expansion to give a correct ranking of welfare under alternative policies.9 The additional term
represents the welfare consequences of the distortion of the composition of expenditure as
between credit-constrained and unconstrained households (or between borrowers and savers);
because this distortion is minimized when Ωt = 0 (i.e., the marginal utilities of income of the





9Of course, in the present analysis, we do not necessarily wish to assume that the difference between
Ω̄ and Ω is small, so that the Taylor series expansion invoked by Cúrdia and Woodford may not be valid.
However, the conclusion that welfare is reduced by spending a greater fraction of time in the crisis state —
which is the key implication of (2.4) for the analysis below — is also true in the Cúrdia-Woodford model,
even in the case that financial distortions in the crisis state are large.
10In the derivation in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), an additional term appears in the loss function relating
to resources consumed by the intermediary sector; I here assume those to be negligible, in order to simplify
the analysis.
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We may now consider how policy should be conducted in order to minimize (2.4). If
we abstract from the possibility that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can
constrain the central bank’s ability to move it as far as it would otherwise wish, then the
problem can be reduced to the choice of state-contingent paths for the variables {πt, yt, Lt,Ωt}
consistent with constraints (2.2) – (2.3) and the transition equation for the regimes so as to
minimize (2.4). Equation (2.1) can then simply be solved to determine the required path for
the short-term nominal interest rate {it} in order to implement the desired evolution of the
other variables.
It is perhaps useful first to consider the special case in which the transition probability γt
is independent of Lt. In this case, the evolution of the regimes (and hence the evolution of the
financial distortion factor {Ωt}) is purely exogenous, and the third term in the objective is
independent of policy. It then suffices to consider how policy affects the expected discounted
value of the other two terms in the objective, which is to say, the traditional inflation
and output-gap stabilization objectives. Furthermore, the evolution of {Lt} has no welfare
consequences in this case, so we can ignore constraint (2.3). The problem then reduces to the
choice of state-contingent paths for inflation and the output gap to minimize the traditional
loss function in analyses of “flexible inflation targeting” subject to the aggregate-supply
constraint (2.2). Both the objective and constraint are thus as in standard treatments (such
as Clarida et al., 1999) that abstract from financial frictions, with the exception that the
exogenous fluctuations in Ωt result in an additional additive (exogenous) disturbance term in
(2.2). Essentially, variations in financial conditions represent another source of “cost-push”
disturbances, in addition to the ut shock already allowed for in Clarida et al. (1999).
In this case, as is well known, the first-order conditions for an optimal policy commit-
ment11 imply that the evolution of inflation and the output gap must satisfy
λyyt − κyφt = 0 (2.5)
πt+1 + φt+1 − φt = 0 (2.6)
in each possible state of the world for all t ≥ 0, where φt is a Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint (2.2) in any given state of the world in period t. (There is also an
11See either Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2011a, sec. 1) for derivation of these conditions.
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additional, generally different, constraint linking the initial period inflation rate π0 and
the initial multiplier φ0;
12 but we need not be concerned with the form of this additional
condition here, as it affects the form of the optimal target criterion for the initial period
only.)
Elimination of the Lagrange multipliers then implies that the evolution of inflation and
output must satisfy
πt + ϕy(yt − yt−1) = 0 (2.7)
in every period t ≥ 1, where ϕy ≡ λy/κy > 0. Moreover, this condition (plus a modified
version of the condition that applies in the initial period only) suffices to uniquely determine
the state-contingent evolution of inflation and output.13 Hence satisfaction of the target cri-
terion (2.7) is necessary and sufficient for the evolution of inflation and output to correspond
to an optimal policy commitment, and the optimal policy can be implemented through a
forecast targeting procedure, under which each time that policy is reconsidered, the central
bank verifies that its intended forward path for policy continues to imply forward paths for
inflation and the output gap that are expected (conditional on the economy’s state at the
time of the exercise) to satisfy the target criterion at all future horizons.14
Alternatively, the first-order conditions (2.5) – (2.6) imply that under optimal policy,
there must exist a constant price level target p∗ such that
pt + ϕyyt = p
∗ (2.8)
for all t ≥ 0, where pt is the log of the general price level, so that πt ≡ pt − pt−1. Note that
under this formulation, it is possible to write a target criterion with the same form in all
periods t ≥ 0, rather than needing a different criterion for the initial period. A criterion
of the form (2.8) implies that (2.7) holds for all t ≥ 1 regardless of the value of p∗; it is
then necessarily possible to choose the value of p∗ so that (2.8) also holds at t = 0 under
12The form of this condition differs depending whether we consider unconstrained “Ramsey policy” or
optimal policy “from a timeless perspective,” as discussed in Woodford (2011a, sec. 1).
13That is, there is a unique set of bounded state-contingent paths for inflation and the output gap that
satisfy both (2.2) and (2.7) each period, and this is the optimal state-contingent evolution of these variables.
14The advantages of forecast targeting as a practical approach to implementation of an optimal policy
commitment are discussed in Svensson (2005, 2011), Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Woodford (2007).
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the optimal policy. This alternative formulation of the optimal target criterion — as what
might be called a flexible price-level target — is particularly convenient when we introduce
the additional complications associated with endogenous financial crises.
In the special case that γt is unaffected by variations in leverage, then, optimal policy
continues to be described by a target criterion that involves only the projected paths of
inflation and of the output gap, and that has exactly the same quantitative form as in a
model without any credit frictions. Monitoring financial conditions is nonetheless necessary
for the conduct of monetary policy for two reasons: (i) the state-contingent paths for inflation
and output that will be feasible and at the same time consistent with the target criterion will
generally depend on the (exogenous) evolution of financial conditions, owing to the “cost-
push” effects of financial crises when they occur; and (ii) the interest-rate path required to
bring about a given evolution of inflation and output will also depend on financial conditions,
owing to the “financial headwinds” terms in (2.1). This simple result is essentially the reason
why Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) find that the target criterion (2.7) continues to provide a
good approximation to optimal policy even in the presence of (largely exogenous) financial
disruptions.
However, matters are more complex if we allow γt to be an increasing function of Lt,
as assumed earlier. In this case (as shown in the Appendix), the first-order condition (2.5)
takes the more general form
zt = βρEtzt+1 − βξXt, (2.9)
where zt is the expression on the left-hand side of (2.5), and Xt is a variable defined as
Xt ≡ γ′t(Lt) ·∆Vt+1|t (2.10)
if Ωt = Ω (that is, when the economy is in the normal state), while Xt ≡ 0 if Ωt = Ω̄. Finally,
in expression (2.10), the variable ∆Vt+1|t indicates the difference that occurrence of the crisis
state as opposed to the normal state will make to the expected continuation value in period
t+ 1, conditional on the state in period t, i.e.,
∆Vt+1|t ≡ E[Vt+1|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω̄]− E[Vt+1|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω], (2.11)
where Vt+1 is the policymaker’s continuation loss looking forward from period t+1 (defined
more precisely in the Appendix), and ht is the state of the world (history of all exogenous
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disturbances, including the history of regime transitions) in period t. In addition, first-order
condition (2.6) continues to apply.
As before, (2.6) implies that under an optimal policy commitment, there must exist a
constant log price level p∗ such that φt = p
∗ − pt for all t ≥ 0, which in turn implies that
(pt − p∗) + ϕyyt = κ−1y zt (2.12)
for all t ≥ 0. When γt is independent of Lt, (2.10) implies that Xt ≡ 0 at all times, so that
(2.9) can be solved forward to yield the (unique bounded) solution zt = 0 at all times, from
which it follows that optimal policy requires that (2.7) be satisfied at all times. But more





substitution of which into (2.12) yields the more general target criterion





where ϕX ≡ βξ/κy > 0. As in the special case, conformity to the criterion (2.14) in all periods
is a necessary and sufficient condition for bounded state-contingent processes {πt, yt, Lt} to
constitute an optimal policy commitment.
Thus even in the more general case, in which the probability of occurrence of a crisis
is endogenous, optimal policy is characterized by conformity to a certain type of flexible
price-level target. The difference now is that the target criterion does not depend solely
on the paths of the general price level and of the aggregate output gap; it also depends on
the projected evolution of another variable, Xt, which for shorthand I shall refer to as the
marginal crisis risk. As indicated by the definition (2.10), this variable measures the rate at
which the expected loss from the occurrence of a financial crisis increases per unit increase in
leverage. Under the assumptions that I have made above, the value of this quantity should
always be non-negative: equal to zero when the economy is in a crisis state, but always (at
least slightly) positive under normal conditions. Even conditional on being in the normal
regime (Ωt = Ω), though, the size of this positive quantity is likely to vary over time. It may
be larger than normal either because the amount of damage that a crisis would do (through
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the distortion of the allocation of resources that will result from a disruption of financial
intermediation) is currently greater than usual (a larger value of ∆Vt+1|t), or because the
amount by which a marginal increase in leverage would increase the probability of a crisis is
currently greater than usual (a larger value of γ′t(Lt)). If γt(L) is a strictly convex function,
as assumed above, then one reason for the marginal crisis risk to be higher than normal
could simply be that leverage Lt is currently higher than its normal level.
3 How Much of a Change in the Policy Framework is
Necessary?
The optimal target criterion (2.14) implies that the central bank should be willing, at least to
some extent, to trade off a greater degree of stability of conventional stabilization objectives
— namely, price stability and output-gap stability — for the sake of greater stabilization
of the marginal crisis risk. Under certain circumstances — specifically, when the current or
anticipated near-term marginal crisis risk is unusually elevated — the target criterion implies
that an ideal policy would tighten monetary conditions to the point that the price level and/or
the output gap undershoot the levels that would otherwise have been considered desirable
for these variables. (The target criterion specifies only that there should be undershooting of
a certain linear combination of these two variables; but because of the Phillips-curve relation
linking short-term variations in these two variables, it is likely that both variables would need
to undershoot their target paths.) In this sense, the model implies that it is appropriate to
use monetary policy to “lean against” a credit boom, even if this requires both inflation and
the output gap to be below their medium-run target values for a time.
This statement requires some immediate qualifications. First, the analysis above is purely
qualitative; considerable research is still needed to provide a sound empirical basis for a quan-
titative specification of crucial relationships such as the endogenous transition probability
γt(L) or the law of motion (2.3). Even the correct definition and measurement of the variable
Lt in these relationships is far from obvious. I have referred to it as the degree of “leverage”
for shorthand, but surely the risk of occurrence of a crisis depends on other aspects of the
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balance sheets of financial institutions as well, such as maturity mismatch and the degree
to which multiple institutions are exposed to the same (or highly correlated) risks. In all
likelihood, a model that could be used for practical policymaking would have to replace the
scalar variable Lt assumed in the simple exposition above by a vector of financial risk fac-
tors; the law of motion (2.3) would have to be replaced by a corresponding equation system.
Research should probably focus first on identifying the risk factors that are most important
in explaining variations in the endogenous transition probability γt; the approach of Davig
and Hakkio (2010) is an example of how this can be done, though they do not consider the
predictive value of financial-sector balance-sheet variables. Once the key financial risk fac-
tors have been identified, attention can turn to the development of a structural econometric
model of the evolution of those variables, with particular attention to the connection between
the risk factors and other endogenous variables that are (directly or indirectly) influenced by
the central bank’s interest-rate policy. Only with a quantitative empirical model of this kind
in hand will it be possible to say anything very specific about the way or degree to which it
is appropriate to “lean against” a credit boom.
Indeed, the merely qualitative discussion above does not yet establish how large the
variations in the final term on the left-hand side of (2.14) are likely to be, and hence it does
not really allow one to say whether a conventional approach to policy (one simply focused on
conformity with a criterion like (2.7)) might not still represent a fairly good approximation
to optimal policy. It is certainly possible that, at least over certain periods of time, variations
in the forecast of the marginal crisis risk would be fairly minimal, so that in practice a policy
based on (2.14) would essentially amount to stabilization of a linear combination of the price
level and the output gap. If we suppose that γt remains negligible for all values of Lt below
some threshold, then γ′t(Lt) will also remain negligible for Lt below that threshold, so that
the marginal crisis risk Xt should be minimal as well. If Lt is far enough below the critical
threshold to have little probability of crossing it over the horizon that is relevant given the
exponentially declining weights in the final term on the left-hand side of (2.14), then the
third term in the target criterion might be small and stable for several meetings of the policy
committee in a row. Under such circumstances, simple and conventional rules of thumb for
monetary policy decisions would likely be adequate. However, even under circumstances of
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this kind, the more general target criterion (2.14) does not give an incorrect signal about
whether policy is on track; and reference to the more general target criterion would be
necessary in order to answer whether a simpler rule of thumb continues to be adequate
or not. It is plausible to suppose that under at least some circumstances, the additional
correction for marginal crisis risk would be of quantitative significance. At any rate, further
efforts to quantify the relations involved in such a calculation would seem appropriate, before
dismissing out of hand the possibility that non-trivial adjustment of the acceptable paths
for the price level and the output gap might be appropriate at some times.
Nor does the analysis offered here imply in any way that the conventional monetary policy
should be assigned the primary responsibility for containing risks to financial stability, so that
other regulatory and supervisory safeguards are unnecessary. To the contrary, because the
analysis identifies reasons for a tension to exist between the conventional stabilization goals
(represented by the first two terms in the loss function (2.4)) and the goal of reducing the
distortions resulting from financial crises (over and above their consequences for the stability
of inflation and the output gap, as represented by the third term in the loss function),
it implies that the existence of additional policy instruments — that could ensure that
significant variations in marginal crisis risk never occur, even when conventional interest-
rate policy is used purely to minimize the variability of inflation and the output gap —
should allow better outcomes on both dimensions. Hence the development of such tools,
possibly including new instruments of “macroprudential policy” as discussed in Woodford
(2011b), is highly desirable to extent that it proves to be practical. Nonetheless, it cannot be
claimed that such tools already exist and have proven their effectiveness, so that there is no
ground at present to dismiss the relevance of financial stability considerations for monetary
policy deliberations.
In the case that additional macroprudential policy tools (such as variable capital require-
ments) exist, and can be flexibly adjusted in response to changing conditions, it would be
necessary to extend the framework sketched above to allow the law of motion (2.3) and/or
the function γt(L) to be shifted by these instruments of policy. In that case, an optimal pol-
icy regime would involve optimal adjustment of both instruments in response to economic
disturbances, and the conditions required for such a joint policy to be optimal could be
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described by a pair of target criteria, one for each instrument, as in Woodford (2011b). But
the target criterion for optimal monetary policy would continue to be of the form (2.14);
the intended adjustment of the macroprudential instrument would simply be an additional
factor to take into account in forming projections of the future paths of the price level, the
output gap and the marginal crisis risk under alternative forward paths for monetary policy.
Only under quite optimistic assumptions should one expect allowance for macroprudential
policy to completely eliminate variations in projected marginal crisis risk, so that monetary
policy decisions can be made without even considering this variable.
Yet while the analysis here suggests that financial stability conditions should be taken into
account in monetary policy deliberations — and research on the kind of quantitative models
needed to analyze this issue should probably be a large part of the agenda for central-bank
research staffs in the near term — it hardly follows that the traditional goals of monetary
stabilization policy should no longer be important, or even that inflation-forecast targeting
should not still prove useful as an organizing framework for monetary policy deliberations.
In the model sketched in the previous section, optimal policy can still be characterized by the
fulfillment of a certain linear relationship between the projected paths of three variables, and
so a forecast-targeting procedure provides a useful practical approach to the implementation
of such a policy. The three variables that must be projected in such a procedure are a price
index, a measure of the output gap, and the “marginal crisis risk”; the first two of these
are the same two variables as are emphasized in traditional accounts of “flexible inflation
targeting” (and in the procedures of forecast-targeting central banks such as the Bank of
England, the Riksbank, and the Norges Bank).
It is quite possible that, much of the time, the monetary policy deliberations required
by the proposed criterion would be quite similar to those that would be undertaken by a
“flexible inflation-targeting” central bank that neglected financial frictions altogether. Under
the assumptions made above, γ′t should be an increasing function of the degree of leverage in
the financial sector; but the marginal crisis risk Xt need not be equally sensitive to variations
in the degree of leverage at all times. If, as suggested above, the crisis risk is negligible for
degrees of leverage below some critical level, then γ′t (and hence the value of Xt) will be small
and relatively insensitive to variations in Lt, as long as Lt remains well below that critical
23
level. At such times, verification that the economy’s projected evolution conforms to the
target criterion would reduce to a simple comparison of the projected paths of inflation and
of the output gap. Under this conjecture, it would only be at times of particular financial
imbalance that the additional term in the target criterion would become a quantitatively
significant factor in policy deliberations. At such times, less weight would be put on the
traditional stabilization goals, in order to reduce the risk of financial crisis; but this would
be done in a way that remained completely continuous with the approach followed in more
normal times.
Moreover, even during times when financial stability concerns cannot be set aside, the
proposed target criterion would continue to imply a clear medium-run target for the inflation
rate; for a commitment to ensure that the economy’s projected evolution is consistent with
the target criterion at all horizons would necessarily imply that departures of the inflation
rate from its optimal long-run level (zero, in the simple model presented here) were purely
transitory. In fact, the proposed target criterion implies something stronger: it implies that
the forecast of the long-run price level should remain constant over time, so that there is a
commitment to eventually reverse any changes in the price level that result from temporary
departures of the inflation rate from its medium-run target. Thus the inflation target is not
merely one that must be satisfied prospectively, in the absence of shocks that cannot be
foreseen well in advance — it is one that the central bank should commit to fulfill ex post,
and regardless of the disturbances that may occur, as long as the realized inflation rate is
averaged over a sufficiently long horizon. Thus while the target criterion does not involve
only the projected inflation rate, it remains true that the policy commitment involves a target
for inflation in a sense which is not true for any other variable: the policy commitment about
the long run is only a commitment about the (cumulative) rate of inflation over the long
run, and it is only this variable for which there is a commitment to a definite numerical
magnitude which is independent of subsequently realized disturbances.
It might be thought that the credibility of a central bank’s commitment to its supposed
inflation target would inevitably be weakened by a more complex target criterion of the kind
proposed, which makes the justifiable short-run departures from the inflation target depend
on additional variables beyond the output gap — and moreover, variables that will likely
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present even more controversial measurement issues than those connected with the output
gap, and that may depart from their normal levels for longer periods of time than has been
typical for the output gap (at least, during the “Great Moderation” period in which inflation
targeting became popular), so that one might fear that these additional terms in the target
criterion could be used to justify departures from the supposed inflation target for years
on end. This could easily be a problem, under a certain conception of inflation targeting,
under which the target criterion is purely forward-looking and relates only to the rate of
inflation that is projected for some fairly short horizon (two to three years in the future),
with “bygones allowed to be bygones.”
The target criterion (2.14) proposed above is actually quite different, because of the
error correction implied by a commitment to a price-level target rather than merely to a
forward-looking inflation target. Under the criterion proposed above, any departure of the
price level from its long-run target path that is justified by an assessment of variations in
the projected marginal crisis risk will subsequently have to be reversed. Moreover, a given
degree of elevation of the assessed marginal crisis risk will not justify ongoing inflation on
one side of the long-run target rate, even if it persists for years: it would only justify a given
size of one-time increase or decrease in the price level, and after this adjustment of the price
level has occurred, the persistence of the abnormal crisis risk would require the price level to
continue to grow at a rate equal to the long-run inflation target. Then, when the abnormal
conditions eventually subside, even the deviation of the price level from its long-run target
path would have to be reversed.
A credible commitment to a (modified) price-level target of the kind proposed here should
also help to mitigate a common fear about proposals to use monetary policy to “lean against”
credit booms. This the fear that, if the credit boom occurs during a period when interest
rates are being kept low because inflation is undershooting its medium-run target level,
tightening policy to restrain the growth of leverage in the financial sector would run the
risk of tipping the economy into a deflationary spiral — a risk that central banks treat
with exceeding caution, owing to the fear that policy easing will cease to be possible once
deflationary expectations set in, owing to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
(This fear was surely a critical factor in the Fed’s decision during the mid-2000s not to
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raise interest rates more quickly, despite warnings of a housing “bubble.”) Such a disaster
scenario has some plausibility in the case of a central bank with a forward-looking inflation
target, for once deflationary expectations result in the zero bound being reached, and as a
consequence in the generation of deflation greater than the central bank would wish, the
nature of the target that the central bank would reasonably be expected to pursue later —
refusing to allow any excess inflation, even to offset unwanted past deflation — would itself
tend to generate a “vicious circle” in which deflation is simultaneously a consequence of
and a justification for deflationary expectations (Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson and Woodford,
2003). But there is much less ground for such fears under a policy commitment of the kind
proposed here. With a commitment to an invariant long-run price level target, any period
in which the price level falls below its target path should immediately create an anticipation
of a future period of higher-than-average inflation to return to the target path. Allowing
inflation below the target rate in order to lean against a credit bubble should not create
expectations of continuing deflation, because such episodes would predictably be followed
periods of corrective inflation. And even if the zero bound were to bind temporarily, the
amount of unwanted deflation that would result should be modest, because the farther the
price level falls below the target path, the greater the amount of “catch-up” inflation that
should be expected in the future.
I therefore conclude that inflation targeting frameworks can and should be adapted to
take account of the possibility of intermittent disruptions of financial intermediation of the
kind experienced in 2007-2009. Taking this challenge seriously will require a new research
program, in order to put quantitative flesh on the stylized model sketched above. But it
should not, in my view, require substantial modification of the fundamental structure of
forecast targeting as a framework for making decisions about interest-rate policy, nor aban-
donment of central banks’ commitment to a quantitative definition of medium-run price
stability. These important innovations of the past twenty years are likely to remain highly
useful despite the additional challenges that must now be faced. To the extent that funda-
mental reconsideration is needed, it should be of the interpretation of inflation targeting as
an approach that focuses purely on the prospective rate of inflation a few years in the future
(rather than on the cumulative realized increase in prices), and on the length of the horizon
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over which inflation should be expected to return to the target rate, rather than on the cri-
teria that should determine how large a transitory departure from price stability is justified.
These are dimensions on which the theoretical literature on ideal inflation targeting regimes
had already argued that actual inflation-targeting procedures could be improved, even be-
fore the global financial crisis and even abstracting from concerns for financial stability (e.g.,
Woodford, 2007). Both the possibility of sometimes hitting the zero lower bound and the
possibility of sometimes needing to use interest-rate policy to restrain the growth of risks
to financial stability make these reforms of inflation-targeting practice all the more urgent.
But the reforms that are needed are a natural extension of the logic of inflation-forecast
targeting, rather than a repudiation of its central aims.
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A APPENDIX
Here I explain the derivation of the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal policy
commitment. Let us recall that the planner’s problem is to choose state-contingent paths
for the variables {πt, yt, Lt,Ωt} consistent with constraints (2.2) – (2.3) and the transition
equation for the regimes so as to minimize (2.4).
This problem can be expressed in a recursive form, if we suppose that in each period t,
the planner observes the current values of the exogenous disturbances (including whether a
regime transition has occurred), and conditional on these, chooses values of yt and Lt and a
state-contingent commitment specifying a target for πt+1 in each of the possible states that
may be reached in the following period. These choices must be consistent with equations
(2.2) – (2.3) and with the state-contingent target for πt chosen in the previous period.
Under this specification of the planner’s strategy set each period, the constraints are all
“backward looking,” and it is possible to solve for an optimal policy commitment (equivalent
to optimal choice of an infinite-horizon state-contingent plan at some initial date) using
dynamic-programming methods.15














looking forward from period t, conditional upon the current realization of the exogenous
disturbances, the inflation target πt previously committed to for this state, the lagged level of
leverage Lt−1, and the current regime Ωt. (The arguments indicating the current realization
of the exogenous disturbances have been suppressed, and are instead represented by the
time subscript on the function Vt(·).) In such a state, values yt, Lt and the state-contingent










+ βEt[Vt+1(πt+1, Lt; Ωt+1)] (A.1)
subject to the inflation pre-commitment πt, constraints (2.2) – (2.3), and the transition law
for the regime Ωt+1. The minimized value of (A.1) is then the value of Vt(πt, Lt−1; Ωt).
15See Woodford (2011a) for further discussion and illustration of methods that can be used to characterize
optimal policy commitments in models of this kind.
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In this recursive version of the problem, the values of πt and Ωt are given, so that one





t + βE[Vt+1(πt+1, Lt; Ωt+1)|ht]
subject to the above constraints, where ht is the complete history of realization of shocks
through period t (so that the previous notation Et[·] can here equivalently be written as
E[·|ht]). One can also eliminate yt as a choice variable by using (2.3) to substitute for yt
as a function of the path of leverage and of exogenous disturbances. The problem can then




(Lt − ρLt−1 − vt)2 + βΓt(Lt; Ωt)E
[
Vt+1(πt+1, Lt; Ω̄)|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω̄
]
+ β(1− Γt(Lt; Ωt))E [Vt+1(πt+1, Lt; Ω)|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω]
subject to the inflation pre-commitment πt and the constraint (2.2), where Γt(Lt; Ωt) is the
conditional probability of the crisis state occurring in period t+ 1.
Differentiating the Lagrangian for this problem with respect to Lt, one obtains the first-
order necessary condition
zt + βξ Et[VL,t+1(πt+1, Lt; Ωt+1)] + βξ ΓL,t(Lt; Ωt) ∆Vt+1|t = 0, (A.2)
where
zt ≡ λyxt − κyφt, (A.3)
φt is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.2), and
∆Vt+1|t ≡ E[Vt+1|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω̄]− E[Vt+1|ht,Ωt+1 = Ω].
Similarly, differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to the value of πt+1 in any of the
possible states of the world in period t+ 1, one obtains a first-order necessary condition
Vπ,t+1(πt+1, Lt; Ωt+1)− φt = 0 (A.4)
for each possible state in period t+1. Note that φt depends only on the history ht (as there
is only one constraint (2.2) corresponding to each possible history up until period t), as does
the variable Vt+1|t.
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Conditions (A.2)–(A.4) are also first-order conditions for a solution to the problem of
minimizing (A.1). Applying the envelope theorem to that problem (which defines the value
function Vt(·)), we can evaluate the partial derivatives of the value function as
Vπ,t(πt, Lt−1; Ωt) = πt + φt, (A.5)
VL,t(πt, Lt−1; Ωt) = −ρξ−1 zt, (A.6)
where zt is again defined as in (A.3).
Using (A.5) to substitute for Vπ in (A.4), we can alternatively write this first-order
condition in the form (2.6) given in the text. Similarly, using (A.6) to substitute for VL in
(A.2), we can alternatively write this first-order condition in the form (2.9) given in the text,
where
Xt ≡ ΓL,t(Lt; Ωt) ∆Vt+1|t. (A.7)
Thus we obtain first-order conditions (2.6) and (2.9) as stated in the text. Finally, the
assumption made in the text about the form of the transition probabilities between regimes
implies that
ΓL,t(Lt; Ω) = γ
′
t(Lt),
ΓL,t(Lt; Ω̄) = 0.
Substituting this for ΓL,t in (A.7), we obtain the definition of the “marginal crisis risk”
variable Xt given in the text.
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